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FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES IN REPLY
1.

In this action, Nielsen claimed that Spencer's alienation of affection

claim was brought against him without probable cause, making the question as to whether
Spencer had probable cause to file the underlying action, an issue in the case. (Rec. 2 ^f 8).
2.

In his wrongful use of civil proceeding claim, Nielsen asserts that

the alienation of affection action was brought against him to harass and humiliate him.
(Rec. 3,^10). Nielsen sought general damages under this tort claim for emotional
distress, mental pain and suffering, and other damages, to be determined according to
proof at trial. (Rec. 3, ^f 10). Nielsen also sought punitive damages under his tort claims.
(Rec. 6 4 20).
3.

At trial Spencer's wife ("Jewelya") testified that she was contacted

by Nielsen, whom she had been sexually intimate with in high school (Rec. 1200, pgs.5152). They met and Nielsen began an intimate sexual relationship with her, knowing that
she was married to Spencer. (Rec. 1200, pg. 53).
4.

As a result of Nielsen's sexual relations with Jewelya, twin girls

were born. (Rec. 1200, pg. 53). Jewelya suspected that the twins belonged to Nielsen, but
did not tell Spencer. (Rec. 1200, pg. 53). She eventually told Spencer about Nielsen and
that the girls belonged to Nielsen. (Rec. 1200, pgs.55-56). Blood tests were eventually
done confirming that the twins belonged to Nielsen. (Rec. 1200, pg. 57). After this time,
Nielsen continued his sexual relationship with Jewelya. (Rec. 1200, pg. 70).
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5.

Later in 1995, Nielsen met Jewelya in Southern California. In

January 1996, Jewelya and Spencer separated. (Rec. 1200, pg. 85). In March 1996,
Jewelya filed for divorce. (Rec. 1200, pg. 71).
6.

Jewelya testified that Lorenzo did not want a divorce. (Rec. 1200,

pg. 72). Even when he made threats of a divorce, she knew that he was not serious, and it
was only an attempt to get her to behave. (Rec. 1200, pg. 98).
7.

Spencer went to marriage counseling on and off with Jewelya. (Rec.

1201, pg. 178). Sometimes they would separate to cool down. One time they stayed
separated for a month. (Rec. 1201, pg. 179, 182).
8.

Spencer testified that there was no physical abuse during the

marriage (Rec. 1201, pg. 183); but he did have one sexual encounter, after learning of
Nielsen's ongoing sexual escapades with his wife. (Rec. 1201, pg. 195-196).
9.

Spencer was involved in a number of lawsuits as a landlord,

involving minor landlord-tenant disputes (Rec. 1201, pg. 207), and one department store,
ZCMI, trying to collect on Jewelya's charge card. (Rec. 1201, pg. 208).
10.

After learning of Nielsen's sexual escapades with his wife, Spencer

approached Nielsen at work and made a tape recording of their conversation. (Rec. 1201,
pg. 245). Spencer told Nielsen to leave his wife and family alone, and that if he didn't, he
would sue. (Rec. 1201, pg. 246).
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11.

In the alienation of affection lawsuit, Spencer disclosed the existence

of this tape, and indicated that it would be produced. (Rec. 1201, pg. 248). However,
Spencer could not find the tape. (Rec. 1201, pgs. 248-249).
12.

At trial Nielsen's counsel tried to get Spencer to admit, that based on

the extra-marital affairs, infidelity on both sides, and accusations of physical abuse (abuse
denied by Spencer); Spencer understood in his own heart and mind that he really did not
have a happy marriage in May of 1996, when he filed his alienation of affection suit
against Nielsen. Such accusations were denied by Spencer. (Rec. 1201, pg. 262).
13.

Spencer did not file his action against Nielsen just to cause him

mental distress or incur legal expenses. (Rec. 1201, pg. 383). Spencer loved his wife and
he wanted their marriage to work. They had been married for over 15 years and had
several children that depended on them. (Rec. 1201, pg. 373). Nielsen had destroyed
Spencer's dreams, his home, and his marriage. (Rec. 1199, pg. 514).
14.

Nielsen admitted at trial that he was sexually intimate with Jewelya

during high school; and after he learned that Jewelya and Lorenzo lived across the street
from where he got his haircut, he initiated contact with Jewelya by buying her a birthday
card and putting it in their mailbox. (Rec. 1199, pgs. 421-422). This lead to a phone call
from Jewelya and Nielsen soon met Jewelya for lunch. (Rec. 1199, pg. 422).
15.

Nielsen testified that he and Jewelya continued to have lunches (Rec.

1199, pg. 423); and then they met at a hotel and were sexually intimate. (Rec. 1199, pg.
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425). Nielsen admitted at trial that he went too far. He had free will. He didn't blame
Jewelya, but accepted full responsibility for his actions. (Rec. 1199, pg. 426).
16.

Nielsen further testified that he was sexually involved with Jewelya

at least a dozen times over a period of two, three, or more, years. (Rec. 1199, pg. 426).
He testified that he had sexual relations with her after it was discovered that he was the
father of the twins. (Rec. 1199, pg. 427) He also testified that he continued his sexual
relations with Jewelya, after Spencer knew the twins belonged to him. (Rec. 1199, pg.
427). The sexual relations continued because Nielsen was "pretty needy in that regard "
(Rec. 1199, pg.428), but Nielsen believed and knew it was a mistake. (Rec. 1199, pg. 428).
17.

Nielsen admitted that in 1995, he met Jeweyla in Southern California

and they spent two days together; the last night at his hotel. (Rec. 1199, pg. 431-432)
Although Nielsen claimed that nothing sexual happened, he admitted that they were
intimate, it didn't look good, and it shouldn't have happened. (Rec. 1199, pg. 432).
18.

Nielsen testified that Spencer filed the alienation of affection lawsuit

against him solely to harass and embarrass him. (Rec. 1199, pg. 439). Nielsen also
testified at trial about the humiliation he suffered and that it had a "horrific effect" on him
and his family. (Rec. 1199, pgs. 435,436,442, 444, 449).
19.

Nielsen testified that he had incurred attorneys fees of approximately

$187,960.00 to defend the alienation of affection lawsuit and to bring his current lawsuit.
(Rec. 1199, pgs. 440 441). No testimony was given as to exactly what amounts had
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actually been paid for attorneys' fees, for which lawsuit, when any payments were made,
or the specific amount of any payments made.
20.

Nielsen testified about his lost earnings, but did not testify as to any

medical treatment or the payment of any medical expenses. Nielsen did not incur any
expenses for medical treatment. (Rec. 1199, pg. 444).
21.

Nielsen conceded that his relationship with Jewelya did cause

damage to Jewelya and Lorenzo's marriage. "It wasn't a good thing."(Rec.l 199, pg. 465).
Nielsen further conceded that the revelation that he was the father of the twins, would
have caused further stress and damage to the marriage. (Rec. 1199, pg. 466). He realizes
that Spencer would have bonded with the twins before learning that he was not their true
father.(Rec. 1199, pg. 473). He also conceded that his continual sexual relations with
Jewelya would have caused stress and damage to the marriage. (Rec. 1199, pg. 466).
22.

Spencer admitted that he and Jewelya did not have a perfect

marriage, but that they loved each other very much prior to Nielsen's involvement. They
anticipated going to the LDS temple and having their marriage sealed and their children
sealed to them for eternity, according to their religious beliefs. (Rec. 1199, pg. 503).
23.

Spencer admitted that he was mad the night Jewelya told him about

Nielsen and that he did call Nielsen to ask him why. (Rec. 1199, pg. 504). Spencer further
admitted that he may have called Nielsen a name and threatened a lawsuit, if Nielsen did
not leave his wife alone. (Rec. 1199, pg. 505).
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24.

Spencer testified that it was like getting hit in the gut with a baseball

bat, to look at your two little girls and know that they're not yours, that you're not their
real father. (Rec. 1199, pg. 505).
25.

Spencer made Jewelya promise him that she would no longer see

Nielsen and that when he saw the children he would do so under certain restrictions; and
that she was not to remain with him and the children. (Rec. 1199, pg. 507).
26.

Spencer testified that when he learned of Nielsen's rendevous with

Jewelya in Southern California in 1995, he was devastated. (Rec. 1199, pg. 508).
27.

Spencer testified that the main reason his marriage with Jeweyla

failed was because of the constant affair and sexual escapades between Nielsen and his
wife. (Rec. 1199, pg. 513). Nielsen had destroyed his marriage, his family, and his life.
Spencer had lost everything he had dreamed of when he married Jewelya. That is why he
filed his alienation of affection claim. (Rec. 1199, pg. 514).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Nielsen in his wrongful use of civil proceedings claim, alleges that Spencer
filed his alienation of affection claim against him without probable cause. A lack of
probable cause is a necessary element to establish a claim for wrongful use of civil
proceeding. Therefore, the lack of probable cause was an issue before the trial court, and
thus, preserved for review on appeal. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002).
One has probable cause if he reasonably believes in the existence of facts
upon which his claim is based, and reasonably believes that under those facts, his claim
6

may be valid under the law. Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 675, fn 9; Gilbert v.
Ince, 981 P.2d 841 (Utah 1999).
Spencer had a reasonable belief in the existence of facts sufficient to
support his claim for alienation of affection. Nielsen had an affair with Spencer's wife
and fathered two children. These undisputed facts were admitted at trial. Therefore,
Spencer's belief in the existence of such facts, when he filed his alienation of affection
claim, must have been reasonable.
Furthermore, if the jury in the alienation of affection lawsuit, would have
determined that Nielsen's conduct was the controlling cause of the alienation of affection,
Spencer would have prevailed on his claim. Therefore, his alienation of affection claim,
based on these admitted facts, was valid under the law; and Spencer's belief that based on
these facts he may have a valid claim under the law, must have been reasonable.
Moreover, the lack of probable cause to establish a claim for wrongful use
of civil proceeding, is a question of law for the court to decide, and not the jury. The jury
can be asked to resolve questions as to a person's intent, or his reasonable belief in certain
facts, when disputed; but it is up to the court to determine the legal issue as to whether or
not, under the established facts, probable cause existed to assert a claim under the law.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 681 B. Based on the undisputed facts, admitted in this
case; Spencer, as a matter of law, had probable cause to file his alienation of affection
claim against Nielsen.
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Since the question of probable cause is not a factual finding, but a question
of law, Spencer is not required to marshal the evidence to challenge it. Regardless, even
if Spencer waived (or failed to preserve) his right at trial, to have the issue of probable
cause decided by the court as matter of law, leaving the matter as a factual determination
for the jury, with all the evidence marshaled in favor of no probable cause; the admitted
facts alone (that Nielsen had a sexual affair with Spencer's wife and fathered two
children) is enough to establish that Spencer had probable cause to file his claim for
alienation of affection against Nielsen. Under such facts a reasonable jury cannot find
that Spencer lacked any probable cause to file his claim for alienation of affection
A dismissal of the underlying action on the merits is also necessary to bring
a claim for wrongful use of civil proceeding. Therefore, whether Spencer's underlying
action for alienation of affection was dismissed on the merits, was an issue before the trial
court, and thus, preserved for review on appeal. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002).
The dismissal of the underlying action as a discovery sanction, does not
constitute a termination on the merits. Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774 (Ut.App. 2004) affd
147 P.3d 383 (Utah 2006). Furthermore, the question as to whether a matter has been
terminated on the merits is a question of law for the court, and not the jury. Palmer
Development Corp. v. Gordon, 723 A.2d 881 (Me. 1999), Restatement (Second) Torts,
Section 673. There was no such ruling by the court in this case. There was never any
decision rendered in the underlying action on the merits. The claim was dismissed as a
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discovery sanction. Failure to cooperate in discovery may result in the dismissal of a
case, and even attorneys' fees or other sanctions under the rules of civil procedure, but it
should not constitute a termination on the merits, opening up a claim for wrongful use of
civil proceeding every time a case is dismissed for discovery reasons.
Nielsen concedes that no damages were awarded on his abuse of process
claim, and Nielsen has not appealed this ruling. Furthermore, what constitutes a "willful
act in the use of the process, not proper in the regular course of the proceeding," is a
question of law for the court (Nielsen admits this in his brief, pg. 31). The trial court did
not make any ruling on this issue as a matter of law and erred in leaving this matter for
the jury to decide. (Rec. 1199, pg. 545).
The special damage provision of § 78-27-44 U.C.A. allows prejudgement
interest on "special damages" actually incurred for medical treatment, when it is properly
alleged in the complaint. This was not alleged in the complaint in this case and there
were no damages in this case for paid medical expenses. Therefore, Nielsen is not
entitled to prejudgment interest on his damage award under § 78-27-44 U.C.A. Since
there were no such damages in this case amending would be a futile act; and since
Nielsen did not seek to amend his pleading at the trial court level, Nielsen cannot raise
this claim or right, for the first time on appeal. State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah 2002).
Nielsen also argues for the first time in his appeal brief, that he should be
entitled to prejudgment interest under common law. However, at trial Nielsen relied on §
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78-27-44 U.C.A. to argue and obtain prejudgment interest. The trial court did not
consider or award prejudgment interest under common law. Therefore, Nielsen cannot
claim for the first time on appeal, that he is entitled to prejudgment interest under
common law. State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah 2002).
Regardless, Nielsen is not entitled to prejudgment interest under common
law, because his claim for wrongful use of civil proceeding is a personal injury tort,
which precludes prejudgment interest under common law. Iron Head Constr. Inc. v.
Gurney, 2008 UTCA (20060841-010408) citing Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 88 P.
1003 (Utah 1907).
Furthermore, Nielsen sought general damages under his tort claim for
emotional distress, and mental pain and suffering, all in an amount to be determined by
the jury at trial. Nielsen testified about his humiliation and emotional distress. The
experience was "horrific" for his family and he suffered humiliation and mental anguish.
(Rec. 1199, pgs 435, 436, 442, 444, 449). Nielsen further alleged in his complaint and
argued at trial, that the alienation of affection action was brought against him to humiliate
and embarrass him. (Rec. 1199 pg. 582). Prejudgment interest is not allowed for such
damages, determined by the jury at trial. Iron Head Constr. Inc. v. Gurney, 2008 UTCA
(20060841-010408) citing Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907).
In addition, the damages Nielsen sought were not fixed or calculable with
mathematical certainty, as required to support an award of prejudgment interest. For
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instance, there was no evidence of what attorneys' fees were actually paid, to whom they
were paid, on which lawsuit they where paid, the date they were paid, or the actual
amount that was paid, all of which would be required to fix the amount of damages or
make them calculable with mathematical certainty. Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d
315, 317 (Utah 1977).
Moreover, Nielsen elected to submit the value, or amount of his damages,
including the reasonableness of his attorneys' fees, to the jury for determination. (Rec.
1199, pg. 560) Since the reasonableness of Nielsen's attorneys fees were at issue and
submitted to the jury for determination; Nielsen is not entitled to prejudgment interest.
James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665 (Ut.App. 1994).
Finally, it cannot be determined from the Special Verdict form, what
amount of damages are for Nielsen's general damages, including those for humiliation,
emotional anguish, and mental pain and suffering; and what amount, if any, is for his
attorneys' fees. Nielsen sought a total of $178,960.00 in attorneys' fees, which the jury
rejected. The jury could have also determined that $95,000.00 was too much for
Nielsen's alleged attorneys' fees, but awarded this amount to compensate Nielsen for his
reasonable attorneys' fees, plus his general damages, including Nielsen's alleged
humiliation, emotional distress, and mental suffering.
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ARGUMENT
I.

SPENCER HAD "PROBABLE CAUSE" TO BRING HIS
ALIENATION OF AFFECTION CLAIM, WHICH IS A
LEGAL QUESTION FOR THE COURT, NOT THE JURY
A, This Court should consider the probable cause issue on appeal.
The lack of probable cause was alleged by Nielsen in his complaint and is a

necessary element to establish the claim of wrongful use of civil proceeding. Therefore,
the lack of probable cause was an issue before the trial court that had to be ruled on in this
case. Since this was an issue before the trial court, alleged in Nielsen's pleadings, this
issue was adequately preserved for appeal. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002).
If not adequately preserved, it should still be consider under the plain error
rule. Plain error is established when (i) an error exits (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court, and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah
1993). First, there was an error in this case because Spencer had probable cause as matter
of law. Second, the trial court should have known based on the admitted facts, i.e. the
affair by Nielsen and fathering of two children, that Spencer had probable cause for filing
his alienation of affection claim against Nielsen. Finally, the error was harmful, because
Nielsen's claim should have been dismissed based upon the existence of probable cause.
State v. Evans, 20 P.3d 888 (Utah 2001).
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If plain error does not exist, the matter should still be reviewed to clarify the
law. State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1995). The Utah Supreme Court, in dealing
with this issue, did not specifically address the differing responsibilities of the court and
the jury at trial in such cases, to determine the existence of probable cause. Gilbert v.
Ince, supra, footnote 13. Therefore, a clarification in the law is needed on the differing
responsibilities of the court and jury, in determining probable cause in such cases.
Finally, an exception to the preservation rule is recognized when the issue
raised is solely a question of law, based on undisputed facts. Pankratz Implement Co. v.
Citizens Nat Bank, 130 P.3d 57 (Kan. 2006). In this case the existence of probable cause
can be found based on undisputed facts, and the presences of such probable cause defeats
Nielsen's claim of wrongful use of civil proceeding, thus ultimately resolving the case.
Therefore, this Court can find, as a matter of law, that Spencer had probable cause, based
on undisputed facts, to file his alienation of affection claim; and therefore, Nielsen's
claim for wrongful use of civil proceeding should be dismissed.
B. Spencer had a reasonable belief in the existence of undisputed
facts to reasonably believe he may have a valid legal claim,
giving him probable cause to file his alienation of affection claim.
One has probable cause if he reasonably believes in the existence of the
underlying facts upon which his claim is based, and reasonably believes that under those
facts his claim may be valid under the law. Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 675,
fn 9; Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841 (Utah 1999).
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Spencer had a reasonable belief in the existence of underlying facts
sufficient to support his claim for alienation of affection. Nielsen had an affair with
Spencer's wife and fathered two children. These facts were admitted at trial. Therefore,
Spencer's belief in the existence of these facts, when he filed his alienation of affection
claim, must have been reasonable.
Furthermore if the jury, in the alienation of affection lawsuit, would have
determined that Nielsen's conduct was the controlling cause in the alienation of affection,
Spencer would have prevailed on his claim. Therefore, his alienation of affection claim,
based on these admitted facts, was valid under the law; and Spencer had a reasonable
belief that based on these facts he had a claim that may be valid under the law.
C. Even if the right to have the court determine probable cause,
as a matter of law, was waived or not preserved; the evidence
when marshaled does not support a finding of no probable cause.
Since the question of probable cause is not a factual finding but a question
of law, Spencer is not required to marshal the evidence to overcome the decision on
probable cause. This Court is not required to assume that a jury's decision is correct,
when the question ruled on is not a finding of fact, but a rule of law. Regardless, even if
Spencer waived (or failed to preserve) his right to have the issue of probable cause
determined by the court, as a matter of law; and the matter is to be left as a factual
determination by the jury in this case; with all the evidence marshaled in favor of the
finding of no probable cause; the admitted facts alone, i.e., that Nielsen had a sexual
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relationship with Spencer's wife and fathered two children, knowing that she was married
to Spencer at the time, is sufficient to establish that Spencer had probable cause to file his
claim for alienation of affection. A reasonable jury under such circumstances cannot find
that Spencer lacked any probable cause to file his claim for alienation of affection. With
these admissions, no matter what evidence is marshaled against Spencer, while a jury may
find that Nielsen's actions was not the controlling cause in the alienation of affection, it
cannot find that Spencer lacked any probable cause to file his alienation of affection
claim against Nielsen.1
D. The jury can resolve the alleged existence of facts that are
in dispute, but the court is still to make the final determination
as to whether or not there was probable cause to file the action.
The question of probable cause should have been decided by the court as a
legal question and not left to the jury to decide. In Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841 (Utah
1999) the Utah Supreme Court noted that the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section
68IB, delineates the responsibilities of the court and the jury in such cases,2 but because
the case was decided on a directed verdict, the Utah Supreme Court did not address the
proper allocation of such decision-making duties at trial. Id. at 846, fn 13.
*A11 of the evidence raised by Nielsen claiming that Spencer failed to marshal the
evidence, deals with whether Nielsen was the controlling cause of the alienation of
affection in their marriage, not with the lack of probable cause to file the underlying
action.
2

§68 IB provides that it is the function of the court to determine whether the
defendant had probable cause for his action. (See complete Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 681B attached in the Addendum to Appellant's Opening Brief, as Exhibit E).
15

Most courts have held that the determination of probable cause is for the
court and not the jury to decide. Armco, Inc. v. Southern Rock Inc., 778 F.2d 1134, 1137
(5th Cir. 1985)(whether probable cause existed is a question for the court and is
distinguishable from the jury's role in finding probable cause in negligence cases); and
Weststar Mortg. Corp. v. Jackson, 61 P.3d 823, 832 (N.M. 2002)(probable cause is a
question of law to be decided by trial judge, and trial court erred in submitting this legal
determination to the jury). See also, Robb v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 798
F.2d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 1986); Williams v. Coombs, 179 Cal.App. 3d 626 (1986); Sheldon
Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal.3d 863 (1989); mdPrewitt v. Sexton, 111 S.W.2d.
891 (Ky. 1989).
This issue should now be addressed on appeal, and this Court should follow
Restatement §681B and the line of cases holding that it's the responsibility of the court to
determine the existence of probable cause in such cases, and not the jury. The court is in a
better position to determine if probable cause legally exists to support a legal cause of
action. If there are issues of fact in dispute the court needs resolved to make this
determination, the jury can be called upon to resolve those specific factual issues that are
in dispute, as provided for in Restatement 68IB(2)(a). However, the ultimate
determination is up to the court; and when sufficient facts are undisputed to establish
probable cause, as in this case, the court should find probable cause as a matter of law.
Weststar Mortg. Corp. v. Jackson, 61 P.3d 823, 832 (N.M. 2002).
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Based on the undisputed facts in this case, Spencer clearly had probable
cause to bring his alienation of affection claim against Nielsen; and the court should have
made this determination, as a matter of law, dismissing Nielsen's wrongful use of civil
proceeding claim. Id. at 832.
II.

THE TERMINATION OF THE UNDERLYING ACTION AS
A DISCOVERY SANCTION WAS NOT "ON THE MERITS"
IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN A CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL USE
OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
A. This Court should rule on the termination on the merits issue.
A termination on the merits of the underlying action was alleged by Nielsen

in his complaint and is a necessary element to establish the claim of wrongful use of civil
proceeding. Therefore, this was an issue before the trial sufficient to preserve it for
review. Furthermore, the claim that the underlying action was dismissed only as a
discovery sanction and not on the merits, was raised in the trial court by Spencer's
counsel.(Rec. 1199, pgs. 551-554). Since this matter was before the trial court and ruled
on, this issue was preserved for appeal. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002).
If not adequately preserved by the trial court's ruling, it should still be
considered under the plain error rule. The claim for wrongful use of civil proceeding
requires, a termination of the prior proceedings on the merits. That did not happen in this
case. Therefore, an error exists. Second, the trial court should have known that the
dismissal of the alienation of affection claim for discovery reasons, was not on the merits.
Third, a ruling by the court that there was no prior termination on the merits, would have
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dramatically changed the outcome of the case. State v. Evans, 20 P.3d 888 (Utah 2001).
If plain error does not exist, it should still be reviewed in order to clarify the
law in Utah. State v. Hasten, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1995); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127
(Utah 1994). In the recent case of Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774 (Ut.App. 2004) affd 147
P.3d 383 (Utah 2006)3 the appellate courts recently clarified that in the context of a claim
for wrongful use of civil proceeding, the termination of the underlying action must be on
the merits. Id. This clarification was not made until after the trial in this case.
Finally, an exception to the preservation rule applies to this matter as well,
as the issues involve a question of law, based on undisputed facts. If the dismissal as a
discovery sanction does not constitute a termination on the merits as a matter of law,
Nielsen's claim must be dismissed, and the matter is resolved. Pankratz Implement Co. v.
Citizens Nat. Bank, 130 P.3d 57 (Kan. 2006).
B. Whether the underlying proceeding was terminated on
the merits is a question of law for the court to decide.
The issue as to whether there was a favorable termination on the merits is a
question of law for the court to decide, and not the jury. Palmer Development Corp. v.
Gordon, 723 A.2d 881 (Me. 1999). Restatement (Second) Torts, Section 673. There was
no such ruling by the court in this case. There was never any decision rendered in the
underlying action on the merits of Spencer's alienation of affection claim. The trial court
recognizing that the previous claim for alienation of affection was not dismissed on the
2

Hatch v. Davis was affirmed on August 11, 2006, over a month after the trial was
held in this case.
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merits, should have ruled that there was no termination of the prior proceeding "on the
merits" to sustain a claim for wrongful use of civil proceeding. Id. Nielsen's claim for
wrongful use of civil proceeding should have then been dismissed.
C. The dismissal as a discovery sanction should not be
considered on the merits for purposes of bringing a
wrongful use of civil proceedings action
The dismissal of the underlying action as a discovery sanction, does not
constitute a termination on the merits. Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774 (Ut.App. 2004) aff'd
\A1 P.3d 383 (Utah 2006). Spencer failed to cooperate in discovery in his alienation of
affection case and as a result had his case dismissed.4 Failure to cooperate in discovery of
a case may result in the dismissal of that case, but it should not constitute a termination on
the merits to support a claim of wrongful use of civil proceedings. Such a penalty is not
provided for under the rules of civil procedure regarding discovery sanctions, and such a
ruling by this court will result in parties being afraid to let their claims be dismissed, other
than on the merits, for fear of being later sued for wrongful use of civil proceedings.
III.

NO DAMAGES WERE AWARDED FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS
Nielsen concedes that no damages were awarded on his abuse of process

claim and Nielsen did not appeal this finding. However, what constitutes a "willful act in
the use of the process, not proper in the regular course of the proceeding," is a question of
law for the court (Nielsen admits this in his brief, pg. 31) and the court did not make any

4

The trial court in the underlying case could have awarded attorneys' fees at the
time the case was dismissed as a discovery sanction, but chose not to.
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ruling on this issue as a matter of law.
The court is in a much better position to determine what is so outside the
regular course of proceeding, as to constitute an abuse of process. For instance,
Spencer's attorney subpoenaed Nielsen's wife and mother for depositions. Nielsen's
attorney filed an objection. A hearing was held and the court ruled that Spencer could not
take their depositions. Spencer and his attorney complied with the court's ruling. The
court could have easily found that such proceedings in discovery matters, is not so
irregular in the regular course of proceeding, as to constitute an abuse of process. The
court erred in leaving this issue for the jury to decide. (Rec. 1199, pg. 545).
VI.

IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED THAT THE DAMAGES
IN THIS CASE MUST BE "SPECIAL DAMAGES" UNDER
§78-27-44 UCA TO AWARD PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
A. Special damages were never properly pled under § 78-27-44
to receive prejudgment interest on paid medical expenses; and
the right to amend cannot be claimed for the first time on appeal.
The special damage provision of § 78-27-44 U.C.A., allows prejudgment

interest on "special damages" actually incurred for medical treatment, when it is properly
alleged in the complaint. This provision does not apply in this case because it was not
properly alleged in the complaint, as required by the Statute. Gleave v. Denver Rio
Grande Western Railroad Co., 749 P.2d 660 (Ut.App. 1988).
Furthermore, there were no paid medical expenses sought in this case.
Therefore, giving leave to Nielsen to amend his complaint will be a futile act, as Nielsen
will not be able to allege such prepaid expenses to comply with the Statute. Id.
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Moreover, in Gleave the Plaintiff filed his motion to amend his complaint at
the trial court level, which motion was granted in part and denied in part. Id. at 671. In
this case, Nielsen failed to file any motion to amend at the trial court level, and thus,
cannot raise this claim, or seek this remedy, for the first time on appeal. State v. Cram, 46
P.3d 230 (Utah 2002).
B. Nielsen cannot argue for the first time on appeal that he
is now entitled to prejudgment interest under common law
Nielsen relied solely on § 78-27-44 U.C.A. to obtain prejudgment interest at
the trial court level and the trial court ruled that he was entitled to interest under the
provisions of § 78-27-44. The trial court made no ruling on the common law and this was
never argued or briefed by the parties. Nielsen cannot change his argument and claim for
the first time on appeal, that he is entitled to prejudgment interest under the common law.
State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah 2002).
C. Nielsen is not entitled to prejudgment interest under common
law, because he made a claim for general damages under a
personal injury tort.
Even if this court considers Nielsen's new argument for the first time on
appeal, Nielsen is not entitled to prejudgment interest under common law, because he
brought a personal injury tort claim, the wrongful use of civil proceeding, claiming that
the underlying action was brought against him to humiliate and harass him. He further
sought general damages under his tort claim for emotional distress, and mental pain and
suffering, in an amount to be determined at trial. Since Nielsen's brought a personal
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injury tort claim he is not entitled to prejudgment interest on his damages under common
law.5 Iron Head Constr. Inc. v. Gurney, 2008 UTCA (20060841-010408) citing Fell v.
Union Pacific Railway Co., 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907). Also the damages Nielsen sought
under his tort claim included general damages for emotional distress, and mental pain and
suffering. Prejudgment interest is not allowed on such general damages brought under
tort claims. Iron Head Constr. Inc. v. Gurney, 2008 UTCA (20060841-010408) citing
Fellv. Union Pacific Railway Co., 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907).
D. Nielsen is not entitled to prejudgment interest under common
law, because he submitted the amount of damages, including the
reasonableness of his attorneys fees, to the jury for determination.
Nielsen is further not entitled to prejudgment interest under common law
because the damages were not fixed or calculable with mathematical certainty as to a
particular time, as required to support a prejudgment interest award. There was no
evidence provided as to what amount of attorneys' fees were actually paid by Nielsen, to
whom or on what case they were paid, or when they were paid, in order to fix or calculate
the amount of damages for prepaid expenses, with mathematical certainty. Bjork v. April
Indus., Inc. 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977).
Moreover, Nielsen submitted the value of his damages, including the
reasonableness of his attorneys fees, to the broad discretion of the jury to determine. (Rec.

5

Not only did Nielsen not seek prejudgment interest under common law, but in his
argument for prejudgment interest under § 78-27-44 U.C.A., he argued that his claim for
wrongful use of civil proceeding was a personal injury tort. (Rec. 1096). Nielsen cannot
now claim the exact opposite on appeal. State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah 2002).
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1199, pg. 560) Since Nielsen put the reasonableness of his attorneys fees at issue and
submitted the matter to the jury to be determined, he is not entitled to prejudgment
interest on his damages under common law. James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 888 P.2d 665 (Ut.App. 1994).
E. The trial court cannot determine post-judgment, that all of the
damages awarded under the Special Verdict form must be special
damages, entitling Nielsen to prejudgment interest
Finally, considering all the damages sought by Nielsen, the trial court
cannot determine from the Special Verdict form that the $95,000.00 awarded is all
"special damages" under § 78-27-44 U.C.A., or that it is all attorneys fees for that matter,
to award prejudgment interest. Nielsen sought damages beyond his attorneys' fees. He
sought general damages for his emotional distress, his humiliation and his mental pain
and suffering.(Rec. 3, ^f 10, & 6, \ 18). Nielsen testified at trial about how the experience
was "horrific" for his family and how he suffered humiliation and mental anguish. (Rec.
1199, pgs 435, 436, 442, 444, 449). Nielsen also alleged in his complaint and argued at
trial, that the alienation of affection action was brought against him solely to humiliate
and embarrass him. (Rec. 1199 pg. 582). These damages are alleged the complaint and
were part of Nielsen's claims when the jury deliberated. There was no stipulation by
counsel or instruction to the jury, limiting Nielsen's damage claim to the payment of
attorneys' fees he had paid to defend the underlying action.
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In fact at trial Nielsen actually sought a total of $178,960.00 in attorneys'
fees, which the jury refused to award. The jury determined that this amount was too high.
The coincidence that the total amount awarded happened to coincide with the amount
Nielsen sought in attorneys' fees to defend the alienation of affection is not enough for
the trial court to determine that the total amount awarded was for attorneys' fees in
defending the alienation of affection case and no other damages. The jury could have
determined that the amount of $95,000.00 was too much solely for Nielsen's attorneys'
fees, but sufficient to compensate Nielsen for his attorneys' fees as well as, his
humiliation, emotional distress, and mental pain and suffering. The trial court simply
cannot determine from the Special Verdict form that the full amount awarded is only for
attorneys' fees or that it constitutes special damages under Section 78-27-44 U.C.A.
CONCLUSION
Based on the admitted facts at trial, Spencer had probable cause, as a matter
of law, to file his claim against Nielsen for alienation of affection. Furthermore, the
dismissal of the alienation of affection claim as a discovery sanction, does not constitute a
termination on the merits. As a result, Nielsen's claim for wrongful use of civil
proceeding should have been dismissed as a matter of law.
There was no "willful act in the use of the process, not proper in the regular
course of the proceeding,"which is a legal issue, and Nielsen's abuse of process claim
should have been dismissed, as a matter of law.
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Nielsen did not properly plead for special damages as required under § 7827-44 U.C.A.; and did not have any medical expenses in this case, so he is not entitled to
prejudgment interest under this Statute. Furthermore, since Nielsen did not have any
medical expenses in this case, his request to amend his complaint to include such
expenses would be futile. Moreover, Nielsen did not seek to amend his complaint at the
trial court level and therefore cannot seek this relief for the first time on appeal.
In addition, Nielsen cannot claim for the first time on appeal that he is
entitled to prejudgment interest under common law. Regardless, Nielsen is not entitled to
prejudgment interest under common law because his claim is a personal injury tort; and
he seeks general damages. Furthermore, Nielsen did not establish a complete and fixed
amount of damages at a particular time to support an award of prejudgment interest; and
moreover, submitted the amount of his damages, including the reasonableness of his
attorneys' fees to the jury for determination at the time of trial.
Based on the Special Verdict form, the trial court cannot determine that all
of the damages that were awarded are "special damages" under § 78-27-44 U.C.A. or that
the damages awarded are only for Nielsen's attorneys' fees.
Based upon the foregoing, the Verdict reached and Judgment entered in the
above case should be reversed and/or set aside; and the claims for wrongful use of civil
proceeding and abuse of process should be dismissed, as a matter of law.
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DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of February, 2008.
BOND & CALL L.C.
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